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CONVEYANCING
Returning to deposits…
Can a failed purchaser recover their deposit if the vendor
subsequently sells the property at a higher price? 
Mark Pawlowski examines a recent Court of Appeal ruling 
‘The crucial point was that
a deposit was an earnest for
the performance of the
contract and, consequently,
could be retained by the
vendor on the purchaser’s
default regardless of
whether the vendor had
suffered any actual loss as a
result of non-completion of
the sale or the amount of
the deposit.’
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law in the
department of law at the
University of Greenwich
I
n an article earlier this year (‘Return of
deposits’, PLJ209, 28 April 2008, p18) I
ventured to suggest that an increase in
market value would not, on its own, jus-
tify the return of a purchaser’s deposit
under s49(2) of the Law of Property Act
1925. At best, this was merely a factor that
had to be weighed against the need for
certainty in transactions for the sale of
land where the clear expectation of the
parties was that a deposit would be
retained by the vendor if the purchaser
failed to complete the sale.
Most recently, the Court of Appeal in
Midill (97PL) Ltd v Park Lane Estates Ltd &
anr [2008] has affirmed the view of the
trial judge, HHJ Mackie QC, that, in order
for the Court to exercise its discretion
under s49(2) to order the repayment of a
deposit, there needed to be something
special or exceptional to justify overrid-
ing the ordinary contractual expectations
of the parties that the purchaser would
lose its deposit if it defaulted. 
The facts 
Gomba International Investments Ltd
(Gomba) owned a company (Park Lane
Estates Ltd) whose only asset was a
commercial property in Park Lane,
London. The claimant (Midill (97PL)
Ltd) entered into a contract with Gomba
to buy the company. The contract pro-
vided for the payment of a 10% deposit
when the contract was signed, a further
payment later on, and the balance on
completion.
The claimant made the interim 
payments but failed to complete the pur-
chase. Gomba then sought to rescind the
contract and later sold the company to a
third party for a higher price than that
originally agreed with the claimant. One
of the issues in dispute between the par-
ties was whether the Court should
exercise its discretion under s49(2) and
order Gomba to repay the deposit. The
claimant argued that the resale of the
property for a profit amounted to a spe-
cial circumstance to justify the return of
the deposit. Gomba, on the other hand,
submitted that it was entitled to keep the
deposit irrespective of the profit it had
made on resale.
First-instance decision 
Although, strictly speaking, the transac-
tion was a contract for the sale of shares
in a company (and not land), it was con-
ceded by Gomba that the share sale fell
within s49(2) as being ‘a contract for the
sale or exchange of any interest in land’. 
Having disposed of this preliminary
point, HHJ Mackie QC held that Gomba
was entitled to keep the deposit despite
the fact that it had resold the property
for a higher price. Applying the guid-
ance given by Arden LJ in Omar v El
Wakil [2001], the starting point was that
a deposit was an earnest for perform-
ance and therefore should not normally
be ordered to be repaid unless the cir-
cumstances for exercising the Court’s
discretion under s49(2) were excep-
tional. Even if the vendor had obtained 
a profit on resale, this was only a factor
to be considered as part of all the 
circumstances and was by no means
conclusive. In the words of the learned
judge (at para 32):
If the position were otherwise and the lia-
bility to repay the deposit depended upon
some future sale price, there would be
considerable uncertainty possible for a
lengthy period. That would create pre-
cisely the uncertainty which a fixed
deposit is intended to avoid.
In the instant case, according to the
judge, there was no special factor that  jus-
tified departing from the normal rule. The
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claimant was a ‘sophisticated investor’
that was fully aware of the risks involved
in failing to complete the sale.
Court of Appeal ruling 
Carnwath LJ (with whom May and
Keene LJJ agreed) found no difficulty in
upholding the approach taken by the
trial judge. In particular, it was apparent
from the authorities that there needed to
be something special or exceptional to
justify overriding the normal rule that a
deposit would become forfeited on the
purchaser’s default.
(a) Weight of authority 
In Michael Richards Properties Ltd v St
Saviour’s Parish, Southwark [1975] Goff J,
in refusing to order the return of the
deposit, concluded that the jurisdiction
under s49(2) should only be exercised
‘sparingly and with caution’. Similarly, in
Cole v Rose [1978] HHJ Mervyn Davies
QC opined that an order under s49(2)
would only be appropriate if there were
‘some special circumstances’ in the case,
being circumstances that suggested that it
would be unfair or inequitable that the
purchaser should lose its deposit. More
significantly, in Bidaisee v Sampath [1995],
a case involving the return of a deposit
under an identically worded provision in
a Trinidad and Tobago statute, the Privy
Council concluded that the absence of
any loss by the vendor (because it had
resold at a profit) did not of itself provide
a sufficient reason for the Court to exer-
cise its discretion in favour of a defaulting
purchaser. In the words of Lord Nicholls:
The traditional deposit paid by a buyer
when he enters into a contract is an
earnest for the performance of the 
contract, and can be retained by the seller
if the buyer defaults. Equity does not
regard this as a penalty against which it
granted relief… Section 49(2) has never
been understood as intended to overrule
that principle, and it should not be so
interpreted or applied.
Thus, according to his Lordship, there
had to be ‘something more’ to justify the
Court’s intervention. In that case, the
vendor’s profit in reselling the land at a
higher price was largely offset by the
amount of interest that the vendor would
have received had the sale been com-
pleted on time. In addition, the Court
was not made aware of the reason for the
higher price. The enhanced price could
have been due to movements in land
prices generally, as opposed to the
vendor obtaining a particularly good
price for the specific land in question.
Because this was a matter of speculation,
it did not, according to Lord Nicholls,
form a proper basis upon which the
Court could exercise its discretion.
More recent cases have adopted a
similar approach. In Omar, referred to
above, Arden LJ expressed the view that,
in the context of a conveyancing transac-
tion, it was common knowledge that if a
purchaser failed to complete, it was
likely to lose its deposit and so, it was
important that there should be certainty
attaching to the consequences of paying
a deposit. In her view, the circumstances
had to be ‘exceptional’ in order to make
it appropriate for the Court to exercise
its discretion under s49(2). 
This approach was followed most
recently in Aribisala v St James’ Homes
(Governors Dock) Ltd [2008] (which
formed the subject of my earlier article,
mentioned above), in which Floyd J con-
cluded, inter alia, that although the
vendor’s profit on resale (amounting to
£366,000) was a factor to be taken into
account, it was not decisive and certainly
not enough (by itself) to make the situa-
tion different from the ordinary case
where a deposit was not refundable. As 
a factor to be taken into account, a 
profit on resale could be significant in
appropriate circumstances, but only in
assessing ‘the overall economic impact’
on the vendor in the purchaser failing to
complete. In Tennaro Ltd v Majorarch Ltd
[2003], for example, Neuberger J took
into account the fact that the vendor
The claimant argued that the resale of the property
for a profit amounted to a special circumstance to
justify the return of the deposit.
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could have sold the property at a higher
price but declined to do so without
giving any proper explanation for the
refusal. Significantly, the purchaser itself
had found the new purchaser (which
was willing to pay more than the con-
tract price) prior to the completion date.
The decision, therefore, to exercise the
discretion under s49(2) turned very
much on special facts.
(b) Wider view 
Against the more restrictive approach
apparent in Omar lies the view taken by
Buckley LJ in Universal Corporation v Five
Ways Properties Ltd [1979], who opined
that the Court had an unqualified dis-
cretion under s49(2) to order repayment 
of a deposit when this would represent
the ‘fairest course between the parties’, 
subject only to the discretion being exer-
cised judicially and with due regard to
all the relevant circumstances.
This wide interpretation of the sub-
section has been followed in some cases
(notably, Dimsdale Developments (South
East) Ltd v De Haan [1984], albeit with
some reluctance) and has found support
amongst several academic writers (see
Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance
(2nd ed), p304-305, Treitel, The Law of
Contract (12th ed), p1084-1086 and Goff
and Jones, The Law of Restitution (7th ed),
para 20-035) who have felt that there is
no need to unduly restrict the court’s
discretion by reading into the subsection
additional hurdles or requirements. In
this connection, the wording of s49(2)
expressly provided for an unfettered
discretion entitling the court to order 
the repayment of a deposit ‘if it thinks
fit’ to do so.
(c) Balance of judicial view 
Despite the academic support for the 
so-called ‘wider view’ expressed by
Buckley LJ in Universal Corporation, the
Court of Appeal in Midill felt bound to
adopt the ‘most recent, considered guid-
ance’ provided by Arden LJ in Omar,
which clearly had the benefit of being in
line with the balance of judicial opinion,
including, most notably, the Privy
Council in Bidaisee, referred to above. 
The crucial point, therefore, was that a
deposit was an earnest for the perform-
ance of the contract and, consequently,
could be retained by the vendor on the
purchaser’s default regardless of whether
the vendor had suffered any actual loss
as a result of non-completion of the sale
or the amount of the deposit. Essentially,
in the words of Lord Nicholls in Bidaisee,
there had to be ‘something more’, or (as
expressed by other judges) ‘something
special or exceptional’, to justify the
Court’s intervention under s49(2).
Conclusion 
The question, of course, remains as to
what will constitute ‘something more’ in
the given circumstances of a particular
case. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal
did not doubt the correctness of
Neuberger J’s decision in Tennaro, men-
tioned above, as being a special case
where the facts were highly unusual
given the very attractive (alternative)
offer made to the vendor before the time
of completion (which had been arranged
by the purchaser itself) and the lack of
any stated reason by the vendor for
rejecting it. By contrast, however, on the
facts in Midill it was clearly not enough
that the vendor had sold at a higher
price some months after the date for
completion. The delay in reselling dis-
tinguished the case from Tennaro but,
more importantly, there was nothing to
indicate that the resale price was excep-
tional, given movements in the market
generally. In the words of Carnwath LJ:
… there is no obvious reason why the pur-
chaser should have the benefit of any
such price rise… it was the vendor who
had borne the risk and cost of holding the
property during the intervening period.
It seems, therefore, that the mere fact
that prices have increased in a rising
market will not be enough to persuade 
a court to order the repayment of the
deposit. However, the position may be
very different if the vendor has been
given the opportunity (by the purchaser)
prior to the completion date to sell to
another purchaser who is willing to pay
more than the contract price. ■
In the context of a contract for the sale of land, a seller’s right at
law to forfeit the purchaser’s deposit is mitigated by s49(2) of the
Law of Property Act 1925, which gives the courts a wide
discretionary power to order the repayment of any deposit ‘if it
thinks fit’, dependent on a general consideration of the conduct of
both parties (especially the purchaser), the gravity of the matters in
question and the amount at stake (Schindler v Pigault [1975] and
Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properties Ltd [1979]).Although the
jurisdiction is statutory, nevertheless, its discretionary character has
been held to be at least akin to equitable relief against forfeiture
(Schindler, above, at 336, per Megarry J) The subsection provides:
‘Where the court refuses to grant specific performance 
of a contract, or in any action for the return of a deposit,
the court may, if it thinks fit, order the repayment of 
any deposit.’
While any limitation or restriction on the scope of the courts’
discretion under s49(2) would appear to be inappropriate in view
of the broad wording of the subsection itself, it is apparent that a
number of guidelines have emerged from cases as to the
circumstances in which the discretion to relieve from forfeiture
should be exercised in favour of a purchaser.
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